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Contrasting Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist Grounded
Theory: Methodological and Philosophical Conflicts
Méabh Kenny and Robert Fourie
University College Cork, Ireland
Grounded Theory (GT) is an innovative research methodology, consisting of
three prevailing traditions: Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT.
Despite arising from the same root, and sharing a number of the original
methodological techniques, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT have
nevertheless diverged to such an extent that they are neither homogenous nor
interchangeable methodologies. They are differentiated by contrasting
philosophical frameworks and conflicting methodological directives. Through
a careful analysis of the literature, the authors propose that the incongruity of
the three GT traditions hinges on three principal and paramount
demarcations: Firstly, their contending coding procedures; secondly, their
opposing philosophical positions; and thirdly, their conflicting use of
literature. The authors argue that these three areas of contention represent the
quintessential distinction between the three GT traditions. Accordingly, this
article will illustrate and contrast the contending coding conventions, uncover
the underlying philosophical positions, and explore the contrasting uses of
literature embedded within Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT.
Keywords: Classic Grounded Theory, Straussian Grounded Theory,
Constructivist Grounded Theory, Coding, Framework, Research Philosophy,
Paradigms, Methodology, Differences between Grounded Theories, Grounded
Theory Diagrams, Literature Reviews, Use of Literature
Grounded Theory (GT) is an innovative methodology, consisting of three prevailing
traditions: Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT. Despite their significant divergence, the
three factions of grounded theorists claim the same origin and continue to embrace a number
of the original methodological techniques penned by Glaser and Strauss in the original GT
text, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). A detailed background of this history is
available in the authors’ previous article (Kenny & Fourie, 2014). Although this present
article is concentrating on the distinctions which differentiate these three factions of GT, it is
imperative to first acknowledge their points of methodological convergence and identify a
number of the foundational GT concepts (as featured in the original Classic GT publication in
1967), which Straussian and Constructivist GT continue to embrace and endorse.
Points of Convergence
The original textbook of GT (The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 1967) outlined that at
the preliminary stages of a study, the researcher should only make choices regarding the
initial gathering of data rather than predetermining the entire procedure of data collection
from the outset of the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser and Strauss (1967) contended
that decisions regarding data collection cannot be entirely prearranged because the analysis of
data will reveal the need for more data. This becomes evident at a number of stages
throughout the research. Firstly, as data are initially coded and categorized, gaps will become
evident, thereby identifying the specific need for further evidence in a particular sphere
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Secondly, during the simultaneous collecting, coding, and analysis
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of data, unexpected concepts may emerge which change the direction of the study
considerably, thereby redirecting the research, and necessitating further data-collection that
could not have been anticipated in advance. Finally, as the underlying hypothesis begins to
surface, gaps in the emerging theory will become evident to the researcher, who subsequently
identifies the specific need for further evidence in a particular sphere. As a consequence, the
researcher’s progressive research sample will be guided by these unfolding identifications
rather than predetermined at the outset of the study. Glaser and Strauss (1967) named this
evolving process theoretical sampling. This procedure of theoretical sampling continues until
the point of saturation, when the analysis has been exhausted and no new data are emerging.
Significantly, these precepts remain intrinsic to Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT as
they each contend that the research sample cannot be predetermined; instead, it must be a
theoretical sample, dynamically led by the emerging theory until the point of saturation.
The original GT methodology (1967) forged a very specific approach to analysing data
which is underlined by the method of constant comparison. As raw data are meticulously
analysed line by line, every incident in the data is coded with a conceptual label. These codes
are collated into a plethora of categories denoting higher-level concepts. Glaser and Holton 1
identified that as the researcher is simultaneously collecting, coding, analyzing and
categorizing data, she is engaged in three levels of constant comparisons (Glaser & Holton,
2004; Holton, 2010):
1) Codes are compared with codes,
2) Codes are compared with emerging categories, and
3) Categories are compared with one another.
At the latter stages of research, Glaser and Holton (2004; Holton 2010) suggest that
comparative analysis encompasses a final dimension (which the authors suggests could be
depicted as the fourth tier of the constant comparative technique):
4) The emerging theory is compared with the literature.
Glaser and Strauss insisted that this dance of the collection, coding and analysis of data,
punctuated by the beat of the constant comparison should “blur and intertwine continually,
from the beginning of an investigation to its end” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 43).The
constant comparison was a distinguishing characteristic of the methodology to the extent that
GT was also known as the constant comparative method (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Giske &
Artinian, 2007; Jones & Alony, 2011). Accordingly, this remains an essential precept in all
three factions of GT as it enables the analyst to proficiently engender a theory that is credible,
consistent, and closely integrated with the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
As well as pioneering the constant comparison, the original GT methodology also
introduced the technique of memo writing. As concepts begin to emerge through the process
of coding and constant comparison, the researcher reflects on the data by recording memos of
her reflections, deliberations and conjectures. Recording memos is critical during this entire
process as it “provides an immediate illustration for an idea” and serves to develop reflection,
ideas, and codes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 108). Glaser and Strauss (1967) also stipulated
that as the researcher begins to write a theory, it is imperative to gather all of the memos
1

In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss identify four stages of the constant comparative
method: comparing incidents applicable to each category, integrating categories and their properties, delimiting
the theory, and writing the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105). However, the elucidation of this develops
with increasing lucidity and coherence in Glaser’s successive publications. Consequently, the author will utilize
these later publications to ensure clarity.
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pertaining to each category, in order to have a succinct illustration of each concept, which in
turn facilitates the theorizing process. Furthermore, they delineated that when it comes to the
final stages of writing the research into a thesis or journal paper, the successive memos will
provide the map for the researcher to articulate the journey of conceptualizing the data,
wresting with complications, and eventually fashioning a theory. Thus, memo writing is
intrinsic to GT methodology and continues to pervade Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist
variations of GT.
The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) also distinguished between substantive and
formal theory. Glaser and Strauss originally cautioned that the process of generating a GT
within a very specific arena, such as parental coping with an early diagnosis of their child’s
hearing loss, yields a limited substantive theory applicable only to this specific field. The
question of whether or not this theory has wider applicability, for example, parental coping
with any trauma or coping in general, represents a leap from substantive (local) to formal (allinclusive) theory and necessitates a further study. Glaser and Strauss suggested that
substantive theory is the bedrock for formal theory and advised that the researcher should
focus on generating only one or the other during the course of a study (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). Significantly, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT continue to operate within
this framework and maintain this distinction between substantive and formal theory.
The above precepts (theoretical sampling, saturation, comparative analysis, memos, and
substantive versus formal theory) signify quintessential characteristics of GT. These features
are deeply embedded within the three derivatives which comprise the GT family. As a
consequence, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT retain a familial resemblance.
Points of Divergence
Despite sharing fundamental GT tenets, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT are not
homogenous or interchangeable entities. Their incongruity essentially hinges on three
principal demarcations: firstly their contending coding procedures, secondly, their opposing
philosophical positions, and thirdly their contrasting use of literature. From a careful analysis
of the literature, we argue that these three areas of contention represent the quintessential
distinction between the three GT traditions.
The remainder of this article will concentrate on these three distinguishing areas which
demarcate Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT as diverging methodologies Firstly the
coding conventions of Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT will each be investigated in
turn. Secondly, the philosophical assumptions underlying each tradition will each be
examined consecutively. Finally the contrasting use of literature will be explored within
Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT.
Coding Conventions
Classic GT: The Original Coding Convention
While the basic coding procedure of the original Classic GT has been maintained, the
presentation of it has developed with increasing lucidity. Glaser’s recent collaborative work
with Judith A. Holton (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), and Holton’s own publications (2010),
present the coding procedures of Classic GT with a succinct clarity Glaser and Holton
propose that the researcher approaches GT data analysis with a series of questions including
“What is the main concern being faced by the participants?” and “What accounts for the
continual resolving of this concern?” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 48). They asserted that
the researcher wrestles with these underlying questions through the process of coding the
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data, which Holton (2010) cohesively summarized as substantive and theoretical coding. As
depicted in the diagram below, these two stages of coding precipitate the discovery of a GT:
Figure 1. The Coding Procedure of Classic GT (Holton, 2010)

These coding stages are imperative to Classic GT as they bind all the concepts of the
methodology together and undergird the entire research process from conception to
conclusion (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton 2010). They are described in detail in Table 1:
Table 1: The Coding Procedure of Classic GT (Holton, 2010)

Stage

Substantive
Coding:
a) Open
Coding

Substantive
Coding:
b) Selective
Coding

Theoretical
Coding

Description
As data are collected and analysed line-by-line, each incident is coded with a key word,
which synopsizes sections of data (Glaser & Holton, 2004). Coded segments are
fragmented from the transcript, compared to each other, and grouped conceptually. These
groupings (called conceptual categories) are given a conceptual title by the researcher,
who forms as many conceptual categories as possible. The researcher engages in the
three levels of constant comparison (as outlined previously). As new evidence continues
to be gathered, compared, analyzed, and categorized, categories become dense and
complex and their inter-relationships begin to become apparent. Subsequently, a
principal core category (or core variable) will emerge. This will encompass the chief
concern of the study, interact with most of the other categories in a significant capacity,
and be sophisticated enough to account for the complexity and nuances within the data
(Giske & Artinian, 2007; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton, 2010; Jones & Alony, 2011).
The researcher reduces her focus to the core category and the categories which
meaningfully relate to it. She engages in theoretical sampling and refines the interview
questions accordingly (Jones & Alony, 2011). For the purpose of filtering out extraneous
material, the collection and coding of incoming data is selectively restricted (or
delimited) to focus exclusively on relevant data (Holton, 2010). As the researcher
saturates these categories, the core category will become increasingly dense and its
theoretical relationships with other relevant categories will become apparent.
Subsequently, the researcher integrates (or reduces) the categories into higher-level
substantive concepts to reach a higher level of conceptualization (Giske & Artinian,
2007; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton, 2010; Jones & Alony, 2011).
Theoretical coding comprises the final level of abstraction, as the researcher
conceptualizes the inter-relationships of the substantive concepts. This gives rise to an
emerging grounded theory that can “account for the relationships between the concepts
thereby explaining the latent pattern of social behaviour” (Holton, 2010, para. 1). Glaser
insists on trusting in emergence of a theory at this point in the research (Glaser, 1992). At
this point literature should be employed as a comparison and conceptual mapping may
also be utilised to facilitate this process (Giske & Artinian, 2007). Theoretical sorting of
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memos can retrospectively convey the progressive formulation of the theory in writing
(Giske & Artinian, 2007; Holton, 2010; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Jones & Alony, 2011).
The Classic GT coding procedure is underlined by the principle of the natural
emergence of a theory to be discovered from the content of the data. Glaser insisted that
while employing the coding procedure, the researcher should patiently “trust that emergence
will occur and it does” (Glaser, 1992, p. 3-4; Glaser & Holton, 2004). Glaser conceded that as
analysts are human, they inevitably have a natural tendency to unintentionally influence the
research with personal biases or interpretations (Glaser, 2002). However, he argued that if the
researcher carefully undertakes the coding procedures, rigorously employs the constant
comparison technique, abstains from literature, and collects a large breadth of data from
many different sources, the totality of these precepts will “correct for bias,” diminish the
effects of the researcher’s personal input, and uncover the underlying “latent patterns” of the
phenomena (Glaser, 2002, para. 24). Thus, Glaser argued that this will ultimately “make the
data objective” (Glaser, 2002, para. 24).
Despite his clarity with regard to methodological directives, Glaser was ambivalent
about what research paradigm Classic GT corresponds to. However, Charmaz (2006), Bryant
(2002), Jones and Alony (2011), and Madill et al. (2000) highlighted the implicit positivist
assumptions imbued within the pursuit of objectivity and the assertions of the researcher’s
unobtrusive discovery of a latent grounded theory within the content of collected data.
Subsequently, these authors stress the connotations of a naïve realist ontology within Classic
GT. They contend that Classic GT represents a “soft positivism” which proposes that that
research entails “a process of revealing or discovering pre-existing phenomena and the
relationship between them” (Madill et al., 2000, p. 4). This is the subject of much criticism,
which will be examined later.
A number of authors have questioned the assertions of objectivity claimed by the
proponents of the Classic GT coding procedure. Urquhart (2002) averred that the process of
coding is inevitably “subjective” as the analyst collects, codes, conceptualizes, and collates
the data according to his or her personal discretion (p. 272). The subjectivity of this process is
inevitable as two researchers coding the same interview transcripts inexorably engender
different conceptual categories (Madill et al., 2000). Moreover the researcher’s influence
permeates every stage of the research, from choices of data collection at the genesis of a
study, to discretionary conceptualization at the conclusion. Thus, rather than unobtrusively or
neutrally discovering an emergent hypothesis, the analyst inevitably has an implicit
interpretative influence in the entire process of generating a GT. Therefore, Classic GT can
be critiqued as an inconsistent methodology as it employs an interpretivist coding procedure
within an objectivist, positivist paradigm (Bryant, 2002, Jones & Alony, 2011, Kelle, 2005).
Straussian GT: Coding with Structure
Although Anselm Strauss was the co-author of the original Classic GT, Glaser and
Strauss diverged in their academic affiliation, and published ensuing literature on GT
methodology separately rather than conjointly (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987). By 1990
Strauss co-authored a further exposition of GT with Juliet Corbin, titled The Basics of
Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. This publication
refined and edited specific aspects of the original (Classic) GT. In particular, Strauss and
Corbin (1990) reconfigured the GT coding procedure. They designed a highly systematic and
rigorous coding structure to create (rather than to discover) a rigorous theory which closely
corresponds to the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998). Strauss and Corbin classified
four coding stages but qualified that the dividing line between each of the successive phases
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is somewhat artificial as the researcher constantly moves back and forth between them in
consecutive coding sessions (1990). Significantly, this reformation of GT was so distinctive
that it became known as Straussian GT. Their framework is illustrated in the diagram below:
Figure 2. The Coding Procedure of Straussian GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990)

Strauss and Corbin’s robust procedure largely followed the same sequential
progression as Glaser’s, but is far more meticulous and specified. They argued that their more
specific and complex coding strategies were beneficial for a number reasons. Firstly, Strauss
and Corbin elucidated that they were “designed to enhance the effectiveness of this
methodology” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). Secondly, Strauss and Corbin conceded that
their assiduous coding process may appear complicated, but they argued that this is
appropriate because human life is complicated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Furthermore,
Strauss and Corbin explicated that the volume and precision of their specific coding
directives were not intended to confuse the novice researcher. To the contrary, they were
specifically designed to “spell out the procedures and techniques” in meticulous “step-by-step
fashion” to assist “persons who are about to embark upon their first qualitative analysis
project” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 8). Thus, their more specific coding directives were
written for the purpose of enhancement and clarity, rather than confusion. The detailed
coding process advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. The Coding Procedure of Straussian GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990)

Stage

Open Coding

Description
As described in Classic GT, the researcher begins data analysis by openly coding
segments of data with conceptual labels to denote the concept they represent. Through
questioning and the constant comparative method, these concepts are grouped into
corresponding categories. During open coding, as categories become increasingly
dense, the researcher may develop sub-categories. Furthermore, categories may also be
subsumed under increasingly abstract, higher-order categories (Strauss & Corbin,
1990, p. 61).
a. Properties of each category
As each category is developed and saturated, the range of properties (features or
characteristics) within each category is demarcated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
b. Dimensions of each category
Strauss & Corbin specify that properties pertaining to a category are scrutinized in
terms of the category’s dimensional ranges, for example, the range of frequency
(often/never), the range of intensity (high/low), the range of degree(more/less), the
range of duration (long/short),or any other dimensional ranges which are evident in
data analysis (1990, p. 72). Subsequently, properties are located (or dimensionalised)
along a continuum (called a dimensional continuum) thus giving each category a
complex dimensional profile (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 70).
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Axial coding represents the process of forging links between a category and its
Axial Coding emerging sub-categories. They are connected through a very specific set of
relationships outlined in the paradigm model.
Paradigm Model
The paradigm model demarcates five sub-categories within every category:
a) causal conditions, b) context, c) intervening conditions, d) action/interactional
strategies and e) consequences. Each of these sub-categories has properties and
dimensions. They are linked to the overarching category through the relationship
specified in their title. This procedure reconfigures some previous standalone
categories and refashions them as sub-categories to a higher-level conceptual category.
Several overarching categories emerge through this process. They grow in density and
precision and mature beyond their aforementioned properties and dimensions (Strauss
& Corbin, 1990).

Selective
Coding

Selective coding encapsulates the process of integrating the categories with a higher
level of abstraction, to fashion a GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As categories become
dense, rich, and precise, their inter-relationships with one another become apparent.
Subsequently, one dominant core category is selected which is broad and abstract
enough to integrate the other categories and to cement the components of the
phenomena (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Once the core category is selected, the
researcher engages in five crucial steps (not necessarily in sequential order) to nurture
the emerging concepts and engender “a picture of reality that is conceptual,
comprehensible, and above all grounded” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117).
a. Story line
The researcher presents a “general descriptive overview” of the core phenomenon of
the study; this descriptive story should be limited to a few sentences (Strauss & Corbin,
1990, p. 119). The researcher should relate the storyline of the study in analytical
terms, delineating the core category.
b. Relating subsidiary categories around the core category with a paradigm
The researcher employs the paradigm model to establish the relationship between the
core category and its newly defined subsidiary categories. This ordering of a hierarchy
of concepts will begin to yield an overarching theory. As Strauss and Corbin explicate,
it takes the form of: “A (conditions) leads to B (phenomenon), which leads to C
(context), which leads to D (action/interaction, including strategies), which leads to E
(consequences)” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 125).
c. Relating categories at a dimensional level
The properties and dimensions within the core category will also be established. The
subsidiary categories will be grouped and located “along the dimensional ranges of
their properties in accordance with discovered patterns” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.
125). This occurs in tandem with the previous stage.
d. Validating their relationships against data
The emerging theory will be considered provisional until it is validated against the
collected data to ensure that it is indisputably grounded in the collected material.
e. Filling in categories that may need further refinement
If there are any remaining “missing details” in the categories, the researcher employs
theoretical sampling to fill in the gaps and ensure conceptual density (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990, p. 141).
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The conditional matrix is not a fourth level of coding analysis; it is a “framework that
summarizes and integrates” the previous three levels of coding (Strauss & Corbin,
1990, p. 158–159). The matrix was designed as an “analytic aid” to assist the
researcher in identifying the breadth of determining conditions and consequences
related to the subject of study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 158). Strauss and Corbin
specify that the matrix encompasses the following eight levels of influence which
range from a micro to a macro scale (1990, p. 163),:
1) Action Pertaining to a Phenomenon
2) Interaction
3) Group, Individual, Collective
4) Sub-Organizational, Sub-institutional Level;
5) Organizational and Institutional Level;
6) Community;
7) National
8) International
The breadth of these successive levels ranges from the specific individual incidents to
the general national/international scale (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The researcher
utilizes the matrix by tracing a specific incident within the studied phenomenon
through the successive levels of the matrix in order to ascertain the conditional path of
the incident. This will help the researcher identify the significant conditions activating
the phenomena, and/or the consequences arising from it. For example, the researcher
takes a specific incident, such as a parent’s experience of receiving an early diagnosis
of their child’s hearing loss with no after-care family support, and traces this incident
through the matrix levels to ascertain the cause, the determining conditions, the
manner in which conditions were manifested, and the resultant consequences (Strauss
& Corbin, 1990). This may lead the researcher to the national level of the matrix to
consider the government’s budgetary cut backs in health care.

Strauss and Corbin’s fastidious coding structure was criticized by both Glaser and
Charmaz. Glaser (1992) contended that Strauss “misconceives our conceptions of grounded
theory to an extreme degree, even destructive degree” (p. 3). In particular, Glaser contested
the complicated coding instructions and protested that the researcher is effectively “forcing”
the data into “preconceived” concepts in order to coerce a theory (Glaser, 1992, p. 3-4). He
asserted that this serves to “interrupt the true emergence” of a theory and, as a consequence,
the “true nature of the data is lost forever” (Glaser, 1992, p. 4). Similarly, Charmaz criticized
that the Straussian GT encompasses an excessive “maze of techniques” (Charmaz, 2000, p.
512). She argued that Strauss and Corbin transformed the “original flexible” coding
guidelines into “immutable rules” which she characterized as positivist, rigid, narrow, and
over complicated (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz asserted that axial coding in particular results in
“awkward scientific terms and clumsy categories” which detract from participants’
experiences and obfuscates analysis with excessive jargon (Charmaz, 2000, p. 525). She also
undermined Straussian conceptual diagrams and maps, criticizing that they create an “overly
complex architecture” that confounds the data and “obscures experience” (Charmaz, 2000, p.
525). Significantly, several contemporary grounded theorists have supported Charmaz’s and
Glaser’s criticisms and argued that the “densely codified operation” of Straussian GT is
excessive (Goulding, 1999, p. 7).
However, Strauss and Corbin defended their coding conception. Before these criticisms
were even published, Strauss and Corbin had already clarified that their coding procedure
should be applied flexibly and adapted to different circumstances and studies, a directive
which Glaser and Charmaz overlooked in their critical analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
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Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin defended the complexity of their structure with a number of
justifications. Firstly, they argued that the prescribed stages are critical to dispel the
researcher’s prejudices and preconceptions which they inevitably bring to, and develop,
throughout the study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Secondly, they asserted that employing the
model will assist, rather than hinder, the researcher as it will facilitate an exacting and
systematic analysis of data which will allow the researcher to relate concepts in a highly
accurate, convincing, and complex capacity (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Finally, they insisted
that this model allows the researcher to build a “rich, tightly woven, explanatory theory that
closely approximates the reality it represents” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 57). Thus, Strauss
and Corbin concluded that “unless you make use of this model your grounded theory analyses
will lack density and precision” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 99).
Straussian GT did not remain a stagnant entity. Following Strauss’s death in 1996,
Corbin continued to publish, and released a second edition of the Basics of Qualitative
Research in 1998, a third edition in 2008, and a fourth edition in December 2014. Corbin’s
successive publications relaxed the formulaic Straussian coding convention, and refashioned
the underlying philosophical assumptions (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). However, she was
careful to distinguish sections of the book that Strauss may not have been in accord with
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Significantly, Corbin’s reformation of Straussian GT moved the
methodology in the direction of Constructivist GT.
Constructivist GT: Coding and Contention
Charmaz, a former student of Glaser and Strauss at the University of California, San
Francisco forged a radical departure from both Straussian and Classic GT. She presented a
third adaptation of GT coding, characterized by a distinctly constructivist philosophy. In stark
contrast to Straussian GT, Charmaz (2008) resisted a concrete, rule-bound, prescriptive
approach to coding, arguing that this stifles and suppresses the researcher’s creativity.
Instead, she fashioned highly adaptable coding guidelines which endorsed an “imaginative
engagement with data” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 168). Charmaz stressed the principle of flexibility
in particular, insisting that the analyst must “learn to tolerate ambiguity” and “become
receptive to creating emergent categories and strategies” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 168). As
illustrated in the diagram below, she proposed a fluid framework, with “at least two stages”
to coding (Charmaz, 2008, p. 159):
Figure 3. The Coding Procedure of Constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2008)

Charmaz’s constructivist coding procedure is punctuated by many generic GT techniques,
including memo writing, constant comparisons, theoretical sampling, and saturation
(Charmaz, 2008). Significantly, this framework, although vastly more malleable, is analogous
with the two-tier structure of Classic GT. Charmaz’s framework is elucidated in Table 3.:
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Table 3. The Coding Procedure of Constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2008)

Stage
1) Initial
or Open
Coding

2)
Refocused
Coding

Description
During initial (or open) coding, Charmaz (2008) suggested that by employing Glaser’s
two key questions, “what is the chief concern of participants?” and “how do they resolve
this concern?” the analyst gleans an invaluable insight in to the collected data (p. 163).
She proposed that the analyst codes for actions and potential theoretical cues rather than
for themes. Charmaz advised that coding with “gerunds, that is, noun forms of verbs,
such as revealing, defining, feeling, or wanting, helps to define what is happening in a
fragment” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 164). This exposes “implicit processes, to make
connections between codes, and to keep their analyses active and emergent” (Charmaz,
2008, p. 164). Charmaz also proposed the generic GT use of in vivo codes, which
encompasses utilizing the language of the participants as codes (2008).
The researcher moves into the next stage, re-focused coding, by identifying the codes that
are recurring or particularly significant in illuminating the studied phenomenon
(Charmaz, 2008). These codes typically have “analytic momentum” and are pertinent to
“carry the weight of the analysis,” which is also described as having the ability to
“capacity carry” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 164). The researcher elevates these codes as
provisional theoretical categories which subsequently undergo selective or focused
coding through the GT techniques of theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and
memo writing (Charmaz, 2008). Memo writing, in particular, is vital to the process of
constructing a theory. Through the medium of memo writing, the researcher can
scrutinize the codes and categories, highlight determining conditions, and trace
progression and consequences (Charmaz, 2008). The memos may also document “gaps in
the data” and help develop conceptual “conjectures” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 166). Thus,
writing and sorting memos captures the unfolding process of interpreting the phenomena
and constructing a theory.

Charmaz’s coding procedure is patently more interpretative, intuitive, and
impressionistic than the Classic or Straussian GT (Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz placed a
particularly strong emphasis on in-depth, intensive interviewing to purposely yield an
intimate exploration of the meanings that participants attribute to their experiences (Charmaz,
2006; Hallberg, 2006). Although these interviews are analysed through the constructivist
coding procedure, the analysis rarely culminates into a prognostic or predicative theory
presented at the conclusion of the research (Hallberg, 2006). Instead, a Constructivist GT
study typically concludes with the researcher’s interpretative understanding (rather than
explanation) of the studied social process which is presented in the form of a “story”
(Hallberg, 2006). Constructivist grounded theorists argue that this narrative approach to GT
does not neglect abstraction as it weaves conceptualization into description (Charmaz, 2006;
Hallberg, 2006), particularly as the concluding story encompasses “categories, conditions,
conceptual relationships, and consequences” (Hallberg, 2006, p. 147).
Charmaz’s reconfiguration of GT was strongly criticized by Glaser. He opposed the
constructivist emphasis on descriptive capture, asserting that it “denies and blocks” the “true
conceptual nature” of GT (Glaser, 2002, para. 28). Glaser argued that the unequivocal
objective of GT is conceptualization, rather than a faithful description of participants’
experiences (Glaser, 2002). Due to Charmaz’s emphasis on the latter, Glaser asserted that
Charmaz is “misled” in considering her methodology to be a GT as a more accurate
classification would be Qualitative Data Analysis (Glaser, 2002, para. 40). In contrast,
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Strauss and Corbin upheld the value of description and shared a sense of obligation to give
their participants a voice and “tell their stories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 281). However,
Strauss and Corbin implemented this value within a rigorous and robust coding framework
which stands in stark contrast with Charmaz’s flexible coding guidelines (Strauss & Corbin,
1990). Strauss and Corbin also retained the goal of producing a “conceptually dense” theory
at the conclusion of the study which could accurately account for relationships between
concepts constructed from data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 278). Accordingly, Glaser
criticized that the exclusive endeavor to theorize is compromised within Constructivist GT as
it promotes narration to the extent that it is “neglecting the fundamental properties of
abstraction analysis” (Glaser, 2002, para. 19).
Glaser also rejected Charmaz’s underlying constructivist epistemology embedded
within her coding procedure. He asserted that the interviewer and interviewee’s mutual
construction and interpretation of data inappropriately elevates the researcher to the status of
co-creator and composer of the story (Glaser, 2002). Glaser argued that this diminishes,
rather than augments, the participant’s perception of a phenomenon, as it permits his or her
experience to be recast by the researcher (Glaser, 2002). He insisted that this “unwarranted
intrusion of the researcher” represents a gross violation of GT as it effectively renders the
“researcher’s interactive impact on data more important than the participants” (Glaser, 2002,
para. 8, 20). Glaser avowed that the participant’s perspective should always be paramount
and should always correct and refine the researcher’s abstractions. As a consequence, he
asserted that the researcher should “take great pains not to intrude their own views in the
data” (Glaser, 2002, para. 14). However, Charmaz defended her position, asserting that it is
impossible for the researcher to forge an unobtrusive relationship with social research as “we
are part of the world we study and the data we collect” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10). Ultimately,
Glaser and Charmaz’s dispute hinged on epistemological differences: Glaser presupposed a
neutral researcher with an unobtrusive impact on data while Charmaz averred the inescapable
interactive impact of the researcher on data. These opposing philosophical positions (which
will be analysed in the following section) are tangibly manifested in contending frameworks
and criticisms of coding and data analysis.
Contending Coding Conventions
The three factions of GT encapsulate three distinct coding structures. The Classic
framework retains and refines the original GT coding procedure which was designed to
discover an emergent theory through systematic analysis of data (Glaser & Holton, 2004;
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Holton, 2010). Straussian GT embodies a more rigorous and robust
coding structure which was forged to create (rather than discover) a theory that closely
apprehends the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Constructivist GT encapsulates a more
impressionistic coding procedure which was fashioned to construct a conceptual
interpretation (rather than exact apprehension) of the phenomena (Charmaz, 2006, 2008).
Significantly, these divergent coding conventions arise from opposing philosophical positions
embedded within competing research paradigms. Therefore it is essential to understand the
philosophical presuppositions underlying the three traditions of GT.
Corresponding Paradigms
There is ample debate in the academic literature as to which paradigm Classic GT best
corresponds to. Bryant (2002) and Urquhart (2002) attested that the original GT texts were
virtually silent on the questions of epistemology and ontology, which has continued to cloak
the philosophical position of Classic GT in ambiguity. Glaser maintained that the
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methodology itself was “discovered, not invented” and as such he resisted marrying it with a
research paradigm, stating that it “stands alone, on its own, as a conceptualizing
methodology” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 75, 39). Glaser primarily perceived GT to be a
research method, which he divorced from philosophical considerations (Urquhart, 2002). He
reiterated his position at a conference address, stating “Let me be clear. Grounded theory is a
general method. It can be used on any data or combination of data” (Glaser, 1999, as cited in
Urquhart, 2002, p. 47). As a consequence of Glaser’s philosophical abstruseness, Moore
(2009) suggested that the covert epistemological assumptions embedded within grounded
theory are not clearly articulated or defined, which has resulted in the “misinterpretation and
misuse of the method” (p. 8).
Charmaz addressed this ambiguity directly. She argued that, despite Glaser’s
reticence, the original Classic GT appears to be closely correlated with traditional positivism
as it implicitly assumes “an objective, external reality, a neutral observer who discovers data,
reductionist inquiry of manageable research problems, and objectivist rendering of data”
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Charmaz traces Glaser’s inclination towards objectivism back to his
formative experience as a graduate student at the Columbia University where Glaser was
influenced by his rigorous quantitative and positivist training under Paul Lasarsfelt (Charmaz,
2000). As explicated previously, a host of academics, including Bryant (2002), Jones &
Alony (2011), and Madill et al., (2000), echo Charmaz’s assessment. Significantly, even
Strauss, the original co-founder of GT, conceded the positivist nuances embedded within the
terminology of discovering a pre-existent theory which emerges from “out there” (Strauss &
Corbin, 1994, p. 279).
However, Charmaz’s assessment is not unanimously accepted. McCann and Clark
(2003) argued that Classic GT is demarcated by an implicit post-positivist (rather than
positivist) paradigm and underlined with a critical realist (rather than realist) ontology (cited
in Moore, 2009). Urquhart (2002) also holds this position, which she attributed to the
influence of symbolic interactionism from the inception of GT through the input of Strauss.
However, Glaser himself later resisted this philosophy stating “GT became considered,
wrongly, as a symbolic interaction method” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 38). He also
objected that at times “grounded theory is considered qualitative, symbolic interaction
research” which he described as “a kind of takeover” (Glaser, 1999, as cited in Urquhart
2001, p. 16). Glaser’s rejection of symbolic interactionism, which encompasses a critical
realist ontology and is a derivate of a post-positive philosophy, indicates his disassociation of
Classic GT with Strauss’ more defined philosophical position. Furthermore, while Charmaz
details Strauss’ considerable influence in weaving symbolic interactionism into the
methodology of Classic GT, she affirms that it is Glaser’s “epistemological assumptions” that
pervade the underlying philosophy of GT (Charmaz, 2006, p. 7).
Glaser’s writing indicates his cognizance of his alleged positivist proclivity (Glaser,
2002). Glaser cited Charmaz’s classification of his ontological and epistemological position
in his article Constructivist Grounded Theory? (2002). He directly quoted Charmaz’s
assertion that Classic GT assumes “an external reality” which is “independent of the observer
and the methods used to produce it” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513, as cited in Glaser 2002, para.
18). In his lengthy citation, Glaser also referenced Charmaz’s avowal that Classic GT
“follow[s] the canons of objective reportage” and culminates in an “objective stance”
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 513, as cited in Glaser 2002, para. 18). Although Glaser proceeded to
unequivocally criticize Charmaz’s handling of GT, he did not refute her identification of
positivist connotations or challenge her classification of the objectivist ontology and
epistemology embedded within Classic GT (Glaser, 2002). Instead, he responded with a
defense of the GT techniques and methodology, contending that they serve to “make the
generated theory as objective as humanly possible” (Glaser, 2002, para. 19). Thus, while
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Glaser criticized Charmaz’s constructivist paradigm and her subsequent reinterpretation of
GT, he refrained from contesting her classification of Classic GT as implicitly positivist. This
reticence may be indicative of his acquiescence.
Charmaz also argued that Strauss and Corbin’s rendition of Straussian GT is also
undergirded with positivist assumptions. To corroborate her assertion, she highlighted the
Straussian ontological presupposition of an external and objective reality, as well as the array
of meticulous methodological procedures which, she argued, strive towards impartial data
collection and espouse the precept of verification (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz tempered her
assessment with the acknowledgement that Strauss and Corbin’s position is more nuanced
than that of Glaser, particularly given their incorporation of the participant’s story into the
research, as well as their acknowledgement that the participant and analyst may not share the
same perspective (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz identified these distinctions (and others) as
strands of post-positivism and traced this disposition back to Strauss’ exposure to the
philosophies of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as a graduate student in the
University of Chicago (Charmaz, 2000). Despite Charmaz’s acknowledgement of these
various influences and nuances, she ultimately asserted that, regardless of Glaser and
Strauss’s divergence, both authors continue to retain a methodology “imbued with positivism
with its objectivist underpinnings” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Thus, Charmaz concluded that
“both endorse a realist ontology and positivist epistemology, albeit with some sharp
differences” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513).
However, Charmaz’s conclusion is disputable. Strauss and Corbin (1991, 1994, 1998)
were very clear about their departure from a positivist realist ontology and unambiguously
expounded a post-positivist critical realist ontology. While they affirmed that there is an
external, objective reality, they clearly averred that the analyst’s grasp of it is limited, and
“only God” can perfectly apprehend the “real nature of reality” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.
4). Strauss and Corbin asserted that the purpose of social research is to journey towards an
“increasingly greater,” but not immutable, representation of reality (Strauss & Corbin, 1998,
p. 4). Strauss and Corbin located their methodology within the philosophy of symbolic
interactionism and pragmatism and emphasized their close affiliation with the philosophical
writings of Dewey (1922) and Mead (1934). With this critical realist perspective, they argued
that a “theory is not the formation of some discovered aspect of a pre-existing reality out
there” but instead emphasized that theories represent “interpretations made from given
perspectives” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 279). They attested that the “human grasp of reality
never can be that of God’s” and as such all grounded theories are to some extent “fallible,”
“temporarily limited,” and “provisional,” particularly as they are forged within a particular
culture and time, and embedded in a specific historical context (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 4;
1994, p. 279, 280). Ultimately, Strauss and Corbin’s assertions are consistent with a postpositivist paradigm which contends that “although reality exists to be uncovered by inquiry, it
is never perfectly apprehensible” (Ghezeljeh & Emami, 2009, p. 17; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Strauss and Corbin’s flavor of post-positivism is very specific as the philosophy of
symbolic interactionism and pragmatism pervade the methodology. These two philosophies
are closely intertwined as symbolic interactionism originally emerged out of pragmatist
philosophy (Jeon, 2004). One of the founders of the philosophy, Herbert Blumer, outlined
that symbolic interactionism is underlined by three simple principles (1986). Firstly, he stated
that “human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for
them” (Blumer, 1986, p. 2). Secondly, he asserted that meanings are not intrinsically present
within entities but that meaning is ascribed to objects, gestures, actions, and ideas through
social interaction (Blumer, 1986, p. 3). Thirdly, Blumer posited that these ascribed meanings
are always subject to modification as they are defined and redefined through an interpretative
process (Blumer, 1986). This interpretative process consists of internal interaction with
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oneself and social interaction with people, and also encompasses resultant actions (Blumer,
1986). Strauss and Corbin (1998, 2008) embraced the symbolic interactionist perspective and
depicted humans as active agents who reflectively act and interact with one another on the
basis of interpreted meanings. They contended that the process of generating meaning is
mediated though language, defined through interaction, and materializes into action (Strauss
& Corbin, 1998). Language, in particular, is the essential medium of this interpersonal and
interpretative process. Thus, Strauss and Corbin embraced the symbolic interactionist
perspective that “human beings respond to a particular situation through how they define that
situation, rather than how the situation is objectively presented to them” (Aldiabat & Le
Navenec, 2011, p. 1067).
Strauss and Corbin also embraced the behavioristic philosophy of pragmatism which
prioritizes the significance of the resultant action (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 2). Strauss and
Corbin cite Dewey’s assertion that “the test of ideas, of thinking generally, is found in the
consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead” (Dewey, cited in Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p.
3). Dewey resisted the misconstrued dualism of knowledge and action, insisting that these
entities are inextricably intertwined (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). He asserted that knowledge
impregnates a new idea which gives birth to action, and that action may also give rise to new
insights and knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). These principles are embedded within the
action-oriented model of Straussian GT. Ultimately, as Strauss and Corbin asserted,
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism are “easily recognizable as the framework for our
own methodology” as Straussian GT is concerned with how participants interpret, act, and
interact with the studied phenomena (Corbin & Strass, 2008, p. 2).
The significance and influence of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism receives
increasing attention in Strauss and Corbin’s successive publications (1998, 2008). They
explain that in earlier publications of their literature, namely the second edition of Basics of
Qualitative Research (1998), their discussion of symbolic interactionism and pragmatist
philosophy was removed by the editor, as the content was considered “too theoretical” and
philosophical debates of research paradigms were not as prevalent at the time (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008, p. x). These deleted segments were later included in the 3rd edition of their
publication (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Consequently, Strauss and Corbin’s (combined)
successive writings on research philosophy, differ only in detail, rather than in philosophical
position. Thus, the authors have quoted from the breadth of Strauss and Corbin’s combined
writings on philosophy, without making chronological distinctions.
Charmaz endorsed the principles of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism but
criticized the Straussian post-positivist expression of it in their systematic coding procedure
and critical-realist ontology (2006). In particular, Charmaz resisted its integration in the
coding procedures, criticizing that the overly prescriptive regulations impinged on creative
analysis. Thus, Charmaz proposed recovering the pragmatist and symbolic interactionist
emphasis on meaning, language, interpretation, and interaction, by introducing them to a
constructivist paradigm with a relativist ontology and a more interpretative methodology
(2006).
Charmaz clearly defined her ontological, epistemological and methodological position
(2000, 2006). Her Constructivist GT is unambiguously underlined by a relativist ontology,
which presupposes the existence of manifold social realities (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).
Charmaz emphasized that her epistemological position unequivocally endorses the researcher
and participant’s co-construction of knowledge and mutual interpretation of meaning, with
the objective of fashioning an interpretive depiction of participants’ experiences (Charmaz,
2000). Charmaz refashioned the methodology of GT by reclaiming the potent tools of GT
from their positivist origins to forge a more flexible, intuitive, and open-ended methodology
which dovetails with a constructivist paradigm (Charmaz, 2000). Ultimately, Charmaz
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argued that her alternative Constructivist GT not only “offers accessible methods for taking
research into the 21st century” but also represents “a middle ground between postmodernism
and positivism” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).
However, Charmaz’s depiction of Constructivist GT as a middle ground between the
polarities of postmodernism and positivism is questionable. Charmaz’s Constructivist GT is
closely associated with a postmodernist relativist ontology (encompassing many realities), a
postmodern relativist epistemology (denoting a high influence of the researcher in the
research), and a postmodern interpretative rendition of the GT methodology (salvaging it
from its positivist roots). Consequently, rather than representing a middle ground between
postmodernism and positivism, Charmaz’s constructivist paradigm is closely correlated with
a postmodernist philosophy. This philosophical position is the subject of much criticism, and
is neither exclusively contemporary, novel, nor unique. Relativism can be traced back to the
Sophists (“educators in fifth- and forth-century BC Greece”) who propagated a relativist
ontological position, advocating that “there is no absolute or objective truth, no truth that
everyone must acknowledge” (Frame, 2008, p. 73). The Sophists advocated that “reality is
what man thinks it is” and held “that there is no objective truth at all, but only truth “for me”
and “for you.”” (Frame, 2008, p. 76, 73) In Plato’s literature, this ontological position is
irredeemably undermined as Socrates accuses that “Sophists themselves are making
assertions of fact. If there is no objective truth, then the Sophists’ positions are not
objectively true” (Frame, 2008, p. 76). Thus Socrates exposes this position as contradictory
and self-refuting (Frame, 2008).
The Use of Literature
As a result of their contending philosophical frameworks, the Classic, Straussian and
Constructivist GT stances on the use of literature is divergent. Glaser and Holton (2004)
recommended that when embarking on research, the GT analyst should suspend any preexisting knowledge from literature or professional/personal experience, to ensure an open
mind, free of undue influences. This position encapsulates the positivist’s concern to remove
the researcher from the research. Furthermore, Glaser asserted that it is essential not to
consult relevant academic literature prior to, or during the process of, undertaking a GT
study. He argued that prior knowledge “violates the basic premise of GT” as it clouds and
compromises the analyst’s ability to perceive a dynamic new concept which has not featured
in the aforementioned literature (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 46). Glaser advised that
consulting the literature should be restricted to a constant comparison at the end of the study,
at which point a specific literature review may be compiled if desired. Ultimately, Glaser’s
position was inspired by the positivist “concern to not contaminate, be constrained by, inhibit,
stifle or otherwise impede” the natural emergence of theory from data (Kelle, 2005, p. 31).
Strauss and Corbin challenged Glaser’s position. They encouraged the appropriate use
of literature at every stage of the study, discerning the difference between an empty head and
an open mind (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Kelle, 2005). They argued that the analyst’s previous
experience and exposure to the subject, as well as a wide variety of literature may (and
should) be employed throughout all phases of the research, from conception to conclusion
(Charmaz, 2006, Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This is consistent with their post-positivist
philosophy which accepts that the researcher inevitably influences the research. Strauss and
Corbin (1990) maintained that a prior and on-going consultation with pertinent literature
engenders manifold benefits: it reveals gaps in the academic literature; it can be employed as
a secondary source of data; it can inspire questions; it can guide theoretical sampling; it can
be utilised for supplementary validation; and it provides an insight into existing theories and
philosophical frameworks. However, Strauss and Corbin’s engagement with the literature
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was not unqualified. While they affirmed the use of literature at every stage of the research,
they did not recommend an exhaustive and comprehensive prior review of all the relevant
literature before embarking on research. They warned that “we do not want to be so steeped
in the literature as to be constrained and even stifled in terms of creative efforts by our
knowledge of it” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 50). Thus, while embracing the continuous use
of literature, Strauss and Corbin also advised restraint, to guard against becoming so blinded
by it as to prevent a new revelation of the studied phenomena. This is consistent with the
critical-realist concern to strive for the closest representation of reality as possible.
Charmaz echoed Strauss and Corbin’s endorsement of literature but developed it a
step further. She suggested that the literature should be compiled in a specific literature
review chapter as well as interspersed throughout the entire thesis (Charmaz, 2006, p. 166).
To guard against this danger of becoming immersed in literature to the extent of losing one’s
creativity, Charmaz advised delaying writing a specific literature review chapter until after
data analysis. She proposed that this resolution would facilitate a comprehensive literature
review without compromising the researcher’s openness and creativity. She argued that a
comprehensive literature review, compiled after data analysis, is efficacious for a number of
reasons: it facilitates the researcher to enter into the dialogue of the pertaining academic field;
it reinforces the researcher’s credibility, authority, and ensuing argument; and it can justify
and explicate the researcher’s rationale in the ensuing chapters of the thesis (Charmaz, 2006,
p. 166-167). Furthermore, the balanced approach of utilizing literature at every point of the
research, but delaying total immersion until the end of the study, efficaciously augments,
rather than asphyxiates, creativity. Charmaz’s position is consistent with constructivist
philosophy, which insists that research does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is influenced
and informed by the context in which the researcher is operating.
Conclusion
It is essential for the GT researcher to comprehend both the principles that unite and
differentiate the three GT traditions, in order to locate their research within a particular GT
tradition and defend their rationale for selecting one tradition above the other two).
Accordingly, the final diagram (Figure 4) on the following page provides a visual map to
guide the researcher in this important endeavor:
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Figure 4. The Uniting and Differentiating Principles of GT

Classic
GT

Straussian
GT

Constructivist
GT

Original CF
designed to
discover a GT

Abstain from
Lit until the
very end

Rigorous CF
designed to
create a GT

Use Lit
appropriately
at every
stage

Open-ended
CF designed
to construct
a GT

Use Lit at
every stage &
compile a Lit
review

Soft
Positivism

Post-Positivism &
Symbolic
Interactionism

Constructivism &
Symbolic
Interactionism

Legend for Diagram # 5
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The purple circle encompasses the uniting principles which are embraced by all three factions of GT.
The three pink circles indicate the three areas of contention where the three traditions of GT disagree.
The blue boxes signify Classical GT positions
The orange boxes signify Straussian GT positions
The green boxes signify Constructivist GT positions
The pink arrows indicate the influence of one disputed precept on another.
CF is an acronym for Coding Framework; Lit is an acronym for Literature.

As illustrated in the concluding diagram (Figure 5), the three traditions of GT are distinct
entities. However, the researcher doesn’t necessarily have to adopt a pure form of one
tradition, and indeed, within the parameters of consistency, there is freedom to blur the
boundaries between Classic, Straussian, or Constructivist GT. In our personal experience, we
began a research endeavor with a clear identification of Straussian GT as the guiding
methodology. However, in the process of data collection and analysis, it became increasingly
evident that while the underlining philosophical position was apt, the formulaic structure of
Straussian GT coding was too rigid for this particular subject of study, which didn’t naturally
fit into Strauss and Corbin’s prescribed paradigm model. Consequently, while retaining the
philosophical foundation of Straussian GT, we relaxed the coding procedure to the extent that
it resembled the coding instructions of Classic GT. Importantly, this did not violate the
integrity of the methodology as Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) repeatedly insisted that their
guidelines should be employed in a flexible capacity and adapted to best suit the unique
dynamics of a study. Thus, while there are clear parameters differentiating the three traditions
of GT, and the researcher needs to ensure a consistent approach, there is nevertheless room
for creativity and flexibility within the execution of the selected GT methodology.
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